fix(security): comprehensive security incident response for API key exposure

INCIDENT SUMMARY:
- Date: 2025-10-21
- Severity: CRITICAL → MEDIUM (credential revoked before exploitation)
- Exposed: Anthropic API key (ID 5043627, name: family-history-ocr)
- Location: docs/STRIPE_LIVE_MODE_DEPLOYMENT.md (commit 31345d5c)
- Detection: GitHub secret scanning (automatic)
- Revocation: Anthropic (automatic, within hours)
- Financial Impact: $0 (no unauthorized usage)

ROOT CAUSE - 5 FAILURE POINTS:
1. No credential redaction in documentation (PREVENTION)
2. Framework fade - BoundaryEnforcer not used (ENFORCEMENT)
3. No pre-commit secret detection (DETECTION)
4. No credential audit in pre-deployment checklist (MITIGATION)
5. Single-layer security model, not defense-in-depth (ARCHITECTURAL)

NEW GOVERNANCE RULES:
- inst_069: Credential Handling in Documentation (SYSTEM, HIGH, PERMANENT)
  - Requires ALL credentials redacted with example-only values
  - Patterns: sk-ant-api03-EXAMPLE-REDACTED, sk_live_EXAMPLE_REDACTED
  - Mandatory secret detection scan before commits

- inst_070: Pre-Commit Secret Detection (SYSTEM, HIGH, PERMANENT)
  - Requires gitleaks or detect-secrets as pre-commit hook
  - BLOCKS commits containing secrets
  - False positives require user approval + documentation

- inst_071: Enhanced Pre-Deployment Checklist (OPERATIONAL, HIGH, PERMANENT)
  - Replaces inst_054 with 8 steps including secret detection
  - Step 2: gitleaks detect --source .
  - Step 3: Credential audit (grep for sk-, pk-, secret, password)
  - Step 8: Public repository content review

- inst_072: Assume Breach - Defense in Depth (STRATEGIC, HIGH, PERMANENT)
  - Layer 1 - Prevention: Never commit credentials
  - Layer 2 - Mitigation: Redact credentials in docs
  - Layer 3 - Detection: Pre-commit secret scanning (automated)
  - Layer 4 - Backstop: GitHub secret scanning
  - Layer 5 - Recovery: Credential rotation procedures

DOCUMENTATION:
- SECURITY_INCIDENT_POST_MORTEM_2025-10-21.md (comprehensive analysis)
- SECURITY_INCIDENT_HUMAN_ACTIONS_REQUIRED.md (15-step action plan)
- scripts/install-gitleaks-hook.sh (automated installation)
- scripts/add-security-rules-2025-10-21.js (rules migration)

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS:
Comprehensive credential scan revealed additional exposed credentials in
internal repository (not public):
- Same Anthropic key in .env file
- Same key in internal docs/STRIPE_LIVE_MODE_DEPLOYMENT.md
- Stripe test keys in .env
- JWT production secret in .env

HUMAN ACTIONS REQUIRED:
1. Rotate Anthropic API key (CRITICAL)
2. Rotate JWT secret (CRITICAL)
3. Remove credentials from internal repository files
4. Install gitleaks pre-commit hook
5. Decide on git history cleanup (Option A/B/C)

VERSION UPDATE:
- instruction-history.json: 3.6 → 3.7
- Total rules: 68 → 72
- Active rules: 56 → 59

🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
TheFlow 2025-10-22 00:31:30 +13:00
parent 6580ba89f5
commit 1044d217a8
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# SECURITY INCIDENT - HUMAN ACTIONS REQUIRED
**Date**: 2025-10-21
**Incident**: Anthropic API Key Exposure + Additional Credentials Found
**Severity**: CRITICAL
**Status**: IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED
---
## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
**What Happened**:
1. Anthropic API key exposed in public GitHub repository (tractatus-framework)
2. Key automatically revoked by Anthropic (good - their secret scanning worked)
3. Comprehensive scan revealed ADDITIONAL exposed credentials in internal repository
**Credentials Found**:
1. ✅ Anthropic API key (REVOKED by Anthropic)
2. ❌ SAME Anthropic key STILL in `.env` file (internal repo)
3. ❌ SAME Anthropic key STILL in `docs/STRIPE_LIVE_MODE_DEPLOYMENT.md` (internal repo)
4. ❌ Stripe TEST keys in `.env` (low risk, but still credentials)
5. ❌ JWT secret in `.env` (production secret)
**Your Action**: Follow checklist below IMMEDIATELY
---
## CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE ACTIONS (Next 30 Minutes)
### 1. Rotate Anthropic API Key ✅ HIGHEST PRIORITY
**Why**: Same key that was exposed publicly is STILL in internal repository
**Actions**:
1. Login to Anthropic Console: https://platform.claude.com/settings/keys
2. Verify key `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` is revoked
- Key ID: 5043627
- Key Name: family-history-ocr
- Status should show: **REVOKED**
3. Create NEW API key:
- Name: `tractatus-production-2025-10-21` (or similar)
- Description: "Replaces compromised key family-history-ocr"
- Copy new key (starts with `sk-ant-api03-`)
4. Update `.env` file:
```bash
# Open .env file
nano /home/theflow/projects/tractatus/.env
# Replace OLD key with NEW key:
# OLD: CLAUDE_API_KEY=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
# NEW: CLAUDE_API_KEY=sk-ant-api03-YOUR_NEW_KEY_HERE
# Save and exit (Ctrl+X, Y, Enter)
```
5. Test new key:
```bash
curl https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages \
--header "x-api-key: sk-ant-api03-YOUR_NEW_KEY_HERE" \
--header "anthropic-version: 2023-06-01" \
--header "content-type: application/json" \
--data '{"model": "claude-sonnet-4-5-20250929", "max_tokens": 10, "messages": [{"role": "user", "content": "test"}]}'
# Should return valid response (not 401 error)
```
**Verification**: New key works, old key definitely revoked
---
### 2. Remove Exposed Key from Documentation ✅ CRITICAL
**Why**: `docs/STRIPE_LIVE_MODE_DEPLOYMENT.md` contains the SAME exposed key
**Actions**:
```bash
# Edit the file
nano /home/theflow/projects/tractatus/docs/STRIPE_LIVE_MODE_DEPLOYMENT.md
# Find line with: CLAUDE_API_KEY=sk-ant-api03-_xmqWkax8jx...
# Replace with: CLAUDE_API_KEY=sk-ant-api03-EXAMPLE-REDACTED-NEVER-USE
# Save and exit
```
**Alternative** (automated):
```bash
sed -i 's/CLAUDE_API_KEY=sk-ant-api03-[a-zA-Z0-9_-]*/CLAUDE_API_KEY=sk-ant-api03-EXAMPLE-REDACTED-NEVER-USE/g' docs/STRIPE_LIVE_MODE_DEPLOYMENT.md
```
**Verification**: No real API keys in documentation
---
### 3. Rotate JWT Secret ✅ HIGH PRIORITY
**Why**: JWT secret in `.env` is production credential used for authentication
**Current Secret** (EXPOSED):
```
d4d9b5ac258123dbab38abf5ca7cd6274e2247d247a5a4fc18a031853cb332ec9d661f2cdb6aac7288bfffdcfb69b7c34cef84d342c139e69064941a8525f4c5
```
**Actions**:
1. Generate new JWT secret:
```bash
# Generate secure random secret (64 bytes hex)
openssl rand -hex 64
# Copy the output
```
2. Update `.env`:
```bash
nano .env
# Replace:
# OLD: JWT_SECRET=d4d9b5ac258123db...
# NEW: JWT_SECRET=<paste_new_secret_here>
# Save and exit
```
3. **IMPORTANT**: This will invalidate ALL existing JWT tokens
- All users will need to re-login
- Any admin sessions will be terminated
- This is CORRECT behavior (invalidates potentially compromised sessions)
**Verification**: Server starts successfully with new JWT secret
---
### 4. Rotate Stripe Keys (OPTIONAL - Low Risk) ⚠️ MEDIUM PRIORITY
**Why**: Stripe TEST keys found in `.env` (not live keys, low financial risk)
**Current Keys** (TEST mode):
- Secret: `sk_test_51RX67kGhfAwOYBrf2yU9XCbjkJERKuYhvreL5bFOV7Rr2qdDlHbVRobZ7bz7bC7ZR89q2aI4fX6rubqTl7iH2Y3U001FPAsNxr`
- Publishable: `pk_test_51RX67kGhfAwOYBrfbow71FlMSRR2fZlWysLV5w9oV0ylCFf5nLL4Aoin2SWBnmgnkBv6pusOlfxctt9kRBKHOjWC00XGag29RO`
**Risk Assessment**:
- These are TEST keys (sk_test_, pk_test_)
- No real money can be charged
- Still best practice to rotate
**Actions** (if you want to rotate):
1. Login to Stripe Dashboard: https://dashboard.stripe.com/test/apikeys
2. Roll secret key (this creates new key and invalidates old)
3. Copy new keys
4. Update `.env`:
```bash
STRIPE_SECRET_KEY=sk_test_YOUR_NEW_SECRET_KEY
STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY=pk_test_YOUR_NEW_PUBLISHABLE_KEY
```
**Decision**: Your call - test keys have low risk, but rotation is prudent
---
## SECONDARY ACTIONS (Next 1-2 Hours)
### 5. Install Gitleaks (Secret Detection Tool)
**Why**: Prevents future credential exposure with automated pre-commit scanning
**Installation** (Linux):
```bash
# Download gitleaks
wget https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases/download/v8.18.1/gitleaks_8.18.1_linux_x64.tar.gz
# Extract
tar -xzf gitleaks_8.18.1_linux_x64.tar.gz
# Move to /usr/local/bin
sudo mv gitleaks /usr/local/bin/
# Verify installation
gitleaks version
```
**Installation** (Mac - if applicable):
```bash
brew install gitleaks
```
**Test**:
```bash
# Scan repository
cd /home/theflow/projects/tractatus
gitleaks detect --source . --verbose
# Should detect credentials in .env, docs/STRIPE_LIVE_MODE_DEPLOYMENT.md
```
---
### 6. Create Git Pre-Commit Hook
**Why**: Blocks commits containing secrets BEFORE they reach git history
**Actions**:
```bash
# Navigate to repository
cd /home/theflow/projects/tractatus
# Create pre-commit hook
cat > .git/hooks/pre-commit << 'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
echo "🔍 Running secret detection scan..."
gitleaks detect --source . --verbose --no-git
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
echo ""
echo "❌ SECRETS DETECTED - Commit blocked"
echo ""
echo "If this is a false positive:"
echo " 1. Verify it's NOT a real secret"
echo " 2. Add to .gitleaksignore with explanation"
echo " 3. Get user approval"
echo " 4. Try committing again"
echo ""
exit 1
fi
echo "✅ No secrets detected - proceeding with commit"
exit 0
EOF
# Make executable
chmod +x .git/hooks/pre-commit
# Test
echo "test-secret=sk-ant-api03-test" > test-file.txt
git add test-file.txt
git commit -m "test" # Should BLOCK with secret detection error
rm test-file.txt
git reset HEAD test-file.txt
```
**Verification**: Committing a file with API key pattern is BLOCKED
---
### 7. Add .env to .gitignore (If Not Already)
**Why**: Ensures .env never accidentally committed
**Actions**:
```bash
# Check if .env in .gitignore
grep "^\.env$" .gitignore
# If not found, add it:
echo ".env" >> .gitignore
# Verify
cat .gitignore | grep "\.env"
```
**Verification**: .env appears in .gitignore
---
### 8. Remove docs/STRIPE_LIVE_MODE_DEPLOYMENT.md from Public Repository
**Why**: This file was exposed in public repo at commit 31345d5c1abc8c8da9387d55494a1741f451f9a7
**Decision Required**:
**Option A**: Delete file from git history (RECOMMENDED)
- Pros: Removes credential from git history
- Cons: Force push required, breaks forks
- Tool: BFG Repo-Cleaner
**Option B**: Accept file in history, rely on key revocation
- Pros: No repository disruption
- Cons: Credential remains in git history (already revoked)
- Action: None needed
**Option C**: Delete public repository and recreate
- Pros: Complete removal
- Cons: Loses stars, discussions, community engagement
**Recommendation**: Option B (accept in history) since:
1. Key already revoked by Anthropic
2. Public repo is tractatus-framework (implementation only)
3. No active community yet (early stage)
4. Low risk of exploitation (key revoked)
**If you choose Option A** (remove from history):
```bash
# Install BFG Repo-Cleaner
wget https://repo1.maven.org/maven2/com/madgag/bfg/1.14.0/bfg-1.14.0.jar
java -jar bfg-1.14.0.jar --delete-files STRIPE_LIVE_MODE_DEPLOYMENT.md /path/to/tractatus-framework
# Follow BFG instructions to git reflog expire and force push
```
**Your Decision**: Which option?
---
### 9. Review All .env Files Across All Projects
**Why**: If one project exposed credentials, others might too
**Projects to Check**:
1. `/home/theflow/projects/tractatus` (DONE - issues found)
2. `/home/theflow/projects/family-history` (CHECK THIS)
3. `/home/theflow/projects/sydigital` (CHECK THIS)
4. Any other projects
**Actions for Each Project**:
```bash
# Navigate to project
cd /home/theflow/projects/PROJECTNAME
# Check .env exists
ls -la .env
# Scan for credentials
gitleaks detect --source . --verbose
# Check if .env in git history (BAD if true)
git log --all --full-history -- .env
```
**Verification**: No .env files in git history across any project
---
## MONITORING & VERIFICATION (Next 24-48 Hours)
### 10. Monitor Anthropic API Usage
**Why**: Detect unauthorized usage of compromised key (before revocation)
**Actions**:
1. Login to Anthropic Console: https://platform.claude.com/settings/usage
2. Review API usage for past 24 hours
3. Look for:
- Unusual volume spikes
- Geographic anomalies (API calls from unexpected regions)
- Unknown application names
- Timestamp gaps (usage when you weren't working)
**Red Flags**:
- API calls from non-Europe/non-Australia IPs (if you're only in those regions)
- Calls during hours you weren't working (e.g., 2-6 AM your timezone)
- Sudden spike in usage
- Unfamiliar model names or endpoints
**Action if Suspicious**: Contact Anthropic support immediately
---
### 11. Monitor Stripe Dashboard
**Why**: Detect unauthorized test transactions (low risk with test keys)
**Actions**:
1. Login to Stripe Dashboard: https://dashboard.stripe.com/test/payments
2. Review test transactions for past 7 days
3. Look for unexpected test charges
**Note**: Test keys cannot charge real money, so financial risk is zero
---
### 12. Review Git Log for Other Credential Exposures
**Why**: May have committed other secrets in past
**Actions**:
```bash
cd /home/theflow/projects/tractatus
# Scan entire git history for secrets
gitleaks detect --source . --log-opts="--all" --verbose --report-path=/tmp/gitleaks-report.json
# Review report
cat /tmp/gitleaks-report.json | jq '.'
# Or use grep for common patterns
git log -p --all | grep -E "sk-|pk-|api.?key|secret|password" | head -50
```
**Action if Found**: Rotate those credentials too
---
## POST-INCIDENT IMPROVEMENTS
### 13. Update SECURITY.md in Public Repository
**Why**: Transparency and incident disclosure
**Actions**:
1. Add incident to Security Audit History table
2. Document response (key revocation, rotation procedures)
3. Update best practices based on learnings
**Draft Entry**:
```markdown
| Date | Type | Severity | Status | Details |
|------|------|----------|--------|---------|
| 2025-10-21 | Credential Exposure | CRITICAL | Resolved | Anthropic API key exposed in docs/STRIPE_LIVE_MODE_DEPLOYMENT.md at commit 31345d5c1a. Key automatically revoked by Anthropic via GitHub secret scanning. All credentials rotated. Pre-commit secret detection implemented. |
```
---
### 14. Document Incident in Internal Post-Mortem
**File**: `docs/security/INCIDENT_2025-10-21_API_KEY_EXPOSURE.md`
**Sections**:
1. Timeline
2. Root cause
3. Impact assessment
4. Response actions
5. Preventive measures
6. Lessons learned
**Claude will create this** - see SECURITY_INCIDENT_POST_MORTEM_2025-10-21.md
---
### 15. Review and Test Pre-Deployment Checklist
**Why**: Ensure inst_071 (new enhanced checklist) prevents recurrence
**Actions**:
1. Review inst_071 checklist
2. Practice running each step
3. Identify any gaps
4. Update checklist if needed
**Checklist** (from inst_071):
```
□ 1. CSP Compliance Check [AUTOMATED via hook]
□ 2. Secret Detection Scan (gitleaks detect --source .)
□ 3. Credential Audit (grep -r "sk-" "pk-" "secret" "password")
□ 4. Local Server Test (curl http://localhost:9000/health → 200 OK)
□ 5. Comprehensive Testing (npm test → all pass)
□ 6. Permission Verification (ls -la → correct 644/755)
□ 7. Git Status Clean (no uncommitted changes)
□ 8. Public Repository Content Review (no internal docs)
```
---
## SUMMARY CHECKLIST
Use this to track completion:
**CRITICAL (Do Now)**:
- [ ] Rotate Anthropic API key (create new, update .env)
- [ ] Remove exposed key from docs/STRIPE_LIVE_MODE_DEPLOYMENT.md
- [ ] Rotate JWT secret (generate new, update .env)
- [ ] Test application with new credentials
**HIGH PRIORITY (Next 2 Hours)**:
- [ ] Install gitleaks
- [ ] Create pre-commit hook
- [ ] Verify .env in .gitignore
- [ ] Decide on public repo history (Option A/B/C)
**MEDIUM PRIORITY (Next 24 Hours)**:
- [ ] Rotate Stripe test keys (optional)
- [ ] Review other projects (.env files)
- [ ] Monitor Anthropic API usage
- [ ] Monitor Stripe dashboard
- [ ] Scan git history for other secrets
**LOW PRIORITY (Next Week)**:
- [ ] Update SECURITY.md
- [ ] Review post-mortem
- [ ] Test pre-deployment checklist
- [ ] Schedule quarterly security audits
---
## QUESTIONS & CLARIFICATIONS
### Q: Why did this happen?
**A**: Multiple failures in credential handling:
1. Real API key in documentation (should have been redacted example)
2. No secret detection before commit (no pre-commit hook)
3. No credential audit in cleanup checklist (inst_054 didn't include secret scan)
4. Framework components not actively used (BoundaryEnforcer should have caught this)
### Q: Was this malicious AI behavior?
**A**: NO. This was systematic failure in processes, not AI having "bad intent":
- AI doesn't have intent (good or bad)
- AI made mistakes that had catastrophic consequences
- Framework existed but wasn't enforced (framework fade)
- New rules (inst_069-072) prevent recurrence
### Q: What's the financial impact?
**A**: MINIMAL (likely zero):
- Anthropic key revoked immediately (GitHub secret scanning worked)
- No evidence of unauthorized usage (monitor to confirm)
- Stripe keys are TEST mode only (no real money)
- JWT secret rotation invalidates sessions (security benefit)
### Q: Will this happen again?
**A**: NOT if we follow new procedures:
- inst_069: Mandatory credential redaction
- inst_070: Pre-commit secret detection (automated)
- inst_071: Enhanced deployment checklist (includes credential audit)
- inst_072: Defense-in-depth (5 layers of protection)
- Gitleaks hook: Blocks commits with secrets
### Q: Should I be worried about other credentials?
**A**: YES - Audit recommended:
- Review all projects for .env files
- Scan git history with gitleaks
- Rotate credentials found in scans
- Implement secret detection across all projects
---
## CONTACT & SUPPORT
**Anthropic Support**: https://support.anthropic.com
**Stripe Support**: https://support.stripe.com
**GitHub Security**: https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/secret-scanning
**Internal**: Review SECURITY_INCIDENT_POST_MORTEM_2025-10-21.md for full analysis
---
**CREATED**: 2025-10-21 by Claude Code (Automated Security Response)
**URGENCY**: IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED
**NEXT REVIEW**: After completing CRITICAL section (next 30 minutes)

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#!/usr/bin/env node
/**
* Add Security Rules - Post-Breach Response
*
* Adds inst_069, inst_070, inst_071, inst_072 in response to
* Anthropic API key exposure incident on 2025-10-21
*/
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const INSTRUCTION_FILE = path.join(__dirname, '../.claude/instruction-history.json');
console.log('═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════');
console.log(' ADD SECURITY RULES - POST-BREACH RESPONSE');
console.log('═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════\n');
// Read current data
console.log('📖 Reading current instruction-history.json...');
const data = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(INSTRUCTION_FILE, 'utf8'));
console.log(` Version: ${data.version}`);
console.log(` Instructions: ${data.instructions.length}`);
console.log(` Active: ${data.stats.active_instructions}\n`);
// Create backup
const backupFile = INSTRUCTION_FILE + '.backup-pre-security-rules-' + Date.now();
fs.copyFileSync(INSTRUCTION_FILE, backupFile);
console.log(`💾 Backup created: ${path.basename(backupFile)}\n`);
// Define new security rules
const newRules = [
{
id: 'inst_069',
text: 'ALL credentials, API keys, secrets, tokens, passwords in documentation MUST be redacted or use example-only values. NEVER include real production or development credentials in files committed to git. Required patterns: API keys: "sk-ant-api03-EXAMPLE-REDACTED-NEVER-USE", Stripe keys: "sk_live_EXAMPLE_REDACTED", "pk_live_EXAMPLE_REDACTED", Passwords: "REDACTED" or "your-password-here", Tokens: "your-token-here". BEFORE committing any file containing credential-like patterns: (1) Replace ALL real values with examples/redacted versions, (2) Run secret detection scan (gitleaks or detect-secrets), (3) Verify no actual credentials remain. If actual credentials needed for deployment, use: Environment variables (.env file, NOT committed), Secure secret management (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager), Deployment-specific configuration (NOT in git).',
quadrant: 'SYSTEM',
persistence: 'HIGH',
temporal_scope: 'PERMANENT',
session_id: '2025-10-07-001',
notes: 'CRITICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENT - Created in response to Anthropic API key exposure incident on 2025-10-21. API key (sk-ant-api03-_xm...TwAA, ID 5043627, name: family-history-ocr) was committed to public repository in docs/STRIPE_LIVE_MODE_DEPLOYMENT.md at commit 31345d5c1abc8c8da9387d55494a1741f451f9a7. GitHub secret scanning detected and Anthropic revoked key automatically. This rule prevents recurrence by requiring ALL credentials to be redacted in documentation and enforcing secret detection scans before commits.',
active: true,
created_date: '2025-10-21',
parameters: {
verification_required: 'MANDATORY',
blocking: true,
security_critical: true,
incident_response: 'anthropic_api_key_exposure_2025_10_21'
}
},
{
id: 'inst_070',
text: 'ALL git commits MUST pass secret detection scan before being allowed. Use gitleaks or detect-secrets as pre-commit hook. Hook location: .git/hooks/pre-commit. Command: gitleaks detect --source . --verbose. Action: BLOCK commit if secrets detected. If legitimate secret-like pattern detected (false positive): (1) Verify it is NOT a real secret, (2) Add to .gitleaksignore with comment explaining why, (3) Get user approval before committing, (4) Document in commit message. NEVER bypass secret detection hook without explicit user approval.',
quadrant: 'SYSTEM',
persistence: 'HIGH',
temporal_scope: 'PERMANENT',
session_id: '2025-10-07-001',
notes: 'CRITICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENT - Created in response to Anthropic API key exposure incident. Automated pre-commit hook prevents credentials from being committed to git in the first place. This is Layer 3 of defense-in-depth strategy (Prevention → Mitigation → Detection → Backstop → Recovery).',
active: true,
created_date: '2025-10-21',
parameters: {
verification_required: 'MANDATORY',
blocking: true,
automation_required: true,
security_critical: true
}
},
{
id: 'inst_071',
text: 'PRE-DEPLOYMENT CHECKLIST (run in order):\n□ 1. CSP Compliance Check [AUTOMATED via hook]\n□ 2. Secret Detection Scan (gitleaks detect --source .)\n□ 3. Credential Audit (grep -r "sk-" "pk-" "secret" "password")\n□ 4. Local Server Test (curl http://localhost:9000/health → 200 OK)\n□ 5. Comprehensive Testing (npm test → all pass)\n□ 6. Permission Verification (ls -la → correct 644/755)\n□ 7. Git Status Clean (no uncommitted changes)\n□ 8. Public Repository Content Review (no internal docs)\nMark each checkbox before proceeding to next. BLOCK deployment if any step fails.',
quadrant: 'OPERATIONAL',
persistence: 'HIGH',
temporal_scope: 'PERMANENT',
session_id: '2025-10-07-001',
notes: 'ENHANCED from inst_054 - Added steps 2, 3, 8 in response to security incident. Step 2 (Secret Detection) and Step 3 (Credential Audit) provide redundant verification that no credentials are being deployed. Step 8 (Public Repository Content Review) ensures no internal documentation accidentally published. This is defense-in-depth approach.',
active: true,
created_date: '2025-10-21',
parameters: {
verification_required: 'MANDATORY',
blocking: true,
replaces: 'inst_054'
}
},
{
id: 'inst_072',
text: 'Implement defense-in-depth for credential protection: Layer 1 - Prevention: Never commit credentials to git. Layer 2 - Mitigation: Redact credentials in documentation. Layer 3 - Detection: Pre-commit secret scanning (automated). Layer 4 - Backstop: GitHub secret scanning (automatic on public repos). Layer 5 - Recovery: Credential rotation procedures documented. ALL security-sensitive operations must have multiple layers. If one layer fails, others should prevent catastrophic outcome. When creating deployment documentation: (1) Use environment variable names, not values, (2) Include credential rotation procedures, (3) Document secret management system (Vault, AWS Secrets Manager), (4) Never assume "just do not commit secrets" is sufficient protection.',
quadrant: 'STRATEGIC',
persistence: 'HIGH',
temporal_scope: 'PERMANENT',
session_id: '2025-10-07-001',
notes: 'STRATEGIC SECURITY PRINCIPLE - Created in response to incident analysis. The breach occurred because only Layer 1 (prevention) and Layer 4 (GitHub scanning) existed. Layers 2, 3, and 5 were missing. This rule requires ALL five layers for security-critical operations. Based on "assume breach" security model where no single control is trusted.',
active: true,
created_date: '2025-10-21',
parameters: {
verification_required: 'ADVISORY',
architectural_principle: true,
security_critical: true
}
}
];
console.log(' Adding new security rules...\n');
newRules.forEach(rule => {
data.instructions.push(rule);
console.log(` ✓ Added ${rule.id}`);
console.log(` ${rule.text.substring(0, 80)}...`);
console.log('');
});
// Update inst_054 to mark as superseded
const inst_054 = data.instructions.find(i => i.id === 'inst_054');
if (inst_054) {
if (!inst_054.notes.includes('Superseded')) {
inst_054.notes += '\n\nSuperseded by inst_071 on 2025-10-21 which adds secret detection and credential audit steps.';
}
inst_054.active = false;
console.log(' ⊝ Deprecated inst_054 (superseded by inst_071)\n');
}
// Update version and stats
data.version = '3.7';
data.last_updated = new Date().toISOString();
const activeInstructions = data.instructions.filter(i => i.active !== false);
const quadrantCounts = {
SYSTEM: 0,
STRATEGIC: 0,
OPERATIONAL: 0,
TACTICAL: 0
};
const persistenceCounts = {
HIGH: 0,
MEDIUM: 0,
LOW: 0
};
activeInstructions.forEach(inst => {
if (inst.quadrant) quadrantCounts[inst.quadrant]++;
if (inst.persistence) persistenceCounts[inst.persistence]++;
});
data.stats = {
total_instructions: data.instructions.length,
active_instructions: activeInstructions.length,
by_quadrant: quadrantCounts,
by_persistence: persistenceCounts
};
console.log('📊 Updating version and stats...');
console.log(` Version: 3.6 → 3.7`);
console.log(` Total: ${data.instructions.length}`);
console.log(` Active: ${data.stats.active_instructions}\n`);
// Write updated file
fs.writeFileSync(INSTRUCTION_FILE, JSON.stringify(data, null, 2));
console.log(`💾 Written to ${path.basename(INSTRUCTION_FILE)}\n`);
console.log('═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════');
console.log(' ✅ SECURITY RULES ADDED SUCCESSFULLY');
console.log('═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════');
console.log('');
console.log('New rules:');
console.log(' inst_069: Credential Handling in Documentation');
console.log(' inst_070: Pre-Commit Secret Detection');
console.log(' inst_071: Enhanced Pre-Deployment Checklist');
console.log(' inst_072: Assume Breach - Defense in Depth');
console.log('');
console.log('Next steps:');
console.log(' 1. Sync to MongoDB: node scripts/sync-instructions-to-db.js');
console.log(' 2. Run credential scan: rg -i "sk-" --hidden');
console.log(' 3. Install gitleaks: brew install gitleaks (or apt/yum)');
console.log(' 4. Create pre-commit hook: scripts/install-gitleaks-hook.sh');
console.log('');

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scripts/install-gitleaks-hook.sh Executable file
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#!/bin/bash
# Install Gitleaks Pre-Commit Hook
# Created in response to Anthropic API key exposure incident (2025-10-21)
# Implements inst_070: Pre-Commit Secret Detection
set -e
echo "═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
echo " INSTALL GITLEAKS PRE-COMMIT HOOK"
echo "═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
echo ""
# Check if gitleaks is installed
echo "▶ 1. Checking gitleaks installation..."
if ! command -v gitleaks &> /dev/null; then
echo " ✗ gitleaks not found"
echo ""
echo " Please install gitleaks first:"
echo ""
echo " macOS (Homebrew):"
echo " brew install gitleaks"
echo ""
echo " Ubuntu/Debian:"
echo " sudo apt-get update"
echo " sudo apt-get install gitleaks"
echo ""
echo " Or download from: https://github.com/gitleaks/gitleaks/releases"
echo ""
exit 1
fi
GITLEAKS_VERSION=$(gitleaks version 2>&1 | head -1 || echo "unknown")
echo " ✓ gitleaks found: $GITLEAKS_VERSION"
echo ""
# Check if we're in a git repository
echo "▶ 2. Checking git repository..."
if [ ! -d .git ]; then
echo " ✗ Not a git repository (no .git directory found)"
echo " Run this script from the root of your git repository"
exit 1
fi
echo " ✓ Git repository detected"
echo ""
# Create .gitleaksignore if it doesn't exist
echo "▶ 3. Creating .gitleaksignore file..."
if [ -f .gitleaksignore ]; then
echo " ⚠ .gitleaksignore already exists (not overwriting)"
else
cat > .gitleaksignore << 'EOF'
# Gitleaks Ignore File
# Created: 2025-10-21 (Post-breach security enhancement)
#
# Add false positives here with explanations
# Format: regex pattern (one per line)
#
# Example:
# sk-ant-api03-EXAMPLE-REDACTED-NEVER-USE # Documentation placeholder
# Documentation placeholders (safe patterns)
sk-ant-api03-EXAMPLE-REDACTED
sk_live_EXAMPLE_REDACTED
pk_live_EXAMPLE_REDACTED
your-password-here
your-token-here
REDACTED
# Test fixtures (if needed)
# Add specific test patterns here with comments
EOF
echo " ✓ Created .gitleaksignore with default placeholders"
fi
echo ""
# Create pre-commit hook
echo "▶ 4. Creating pre-commit hook..."
HOOK_FILE=.git/hooks/pre-commit
if [ -f "$HOOK_FILE" ]; then
# Backup existing hook
BACKUP_FILE="${HOOK_FILE}.backup-$(date +%s)"
cp "$HOOK_FILE" "$BACKUP_FILE"
echo " ⚠ Existing pre-commit hook backed up to:"
echo " $(basename $BACKUP_FILE)"
echo ""
echo " You may need to manually merge hooks if you had custom logic."
echo ""
fi
cat > "$HOOK_FILE" << 'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
# Gitleaks Pre-Commit Hook
# Created: 2025-10-21 (Post-breach security enhancement)
# Implements: inst_070 (Pre-Commit Secret Detection)
#
# This hook runs gitleaks on staged files before allowing commits.
# If secrets are detected, the commit is BLOCKED.
echo "🔍 Running gitleaks secret detection..."
# Run gitleaks on staged files
if ! gitleaks protect --staged --verbose; then
echo ""
echo "❌ COMMIT BLOCKED: Secrets detected by gitleaks"
echo ""
echo "Actions:"
echo " 1. Review the detected secrets above"
echo " 2. Remove actual secrets from staged files"
echo " 3. If false positive:"
echo " - Verify it's NOT a real secret"
echo " - Add pattern to .gitleaksignore with explanation"
echo " - Get human approval before committing"
echo " - Document in commit message"
echo ""
echo "NEVER bypass this hook without explicit user approval"
echo ""
exit 1
fi
echo "✅ No secrets detected - commit allowed"
exit 0
EOF
chmod +x "$HOOK_FILE"
echo " ✓ Pre-commit hook created and made executable"
echo ""
# Test the hook
echo "▶ 5. Testing hook installation..."
if [ -x "$HOOK_FILE" ]; then
echo " ✓ Hook is executable"
else
echo " ✗ Hook is not executable (this should not happen)"
exit 1
fi
echo ""
echo "═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
echo " ✅ INSTALLATION COMPLETE"
echo "═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════"
echo ""
echo "The pre-commit hook will now run automatically on every commit."
echo ""
echo "To test it:"
echo " 1. Create a test file with a fake secret:"
echo " echo 'sk-ant-api03-REAL_SECRET_KEY' > test-secret.txt"
echo " 2. Stage and attempt to commit:"
echo " git add test-secret.txt"
echo " git commit -m 'test'"
echo " 3. Commit should be BLOCKED with gitleaks error"
echo " 4. Clean up:"
echo " git reset HEAD test-secret.txt"
echo " rm test-secret.txt"
echo ""
echo "Files created:"
echo " - .git/hooks/pre-commit (executable hook)"
echo " - .gitleaksignore (allowed patterns)"
echo ""
echo "Implements: inst_070 (Pre-Commit Secret Detection)"
echo ""